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Abstract 
Although all Americans may utilize, benefit from, and complain about healthcare, few actually 
understand the underlying costs. It is easy to blame politicians, large hospitals, or greedy 
pilysicians for our nation's current healthcare crisis, but they might not be at fault. Through 
analyzing two aspects ofheaIthcare costs-defensive medicine and medical malpractice 
insurance-I hope to give the average American the ability to understand how both of these 
factor in to what they are paying for healthcare. 
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As healthcare prices continue to rise and insurance coverage continues to shrink many 
Americans have begun to wonder where we went wrong. Whose fault is it that the average 
American can ' t afford private health insurance? Or that Medicare will soon cost more than the 
taxes bring in? Will the new Obamacare solve these problems? Unfortunately, there is no clear 
answer to these questions and only time will tell whether or not any current legislation will 
improve the situation. By looking at individual factors of healthcare costs one can pinpoint 
changes that can make a difference. Defensive medicine and medical malpractice insurance 
premiums are two contributing factors to the cost of healthcare. However, whether or not 
changes in both or either will significantly make a difference is debatable. 
Defensive medicine is not a new concept. For over thirty years, physicians, researchers, 
and government officials alike have claimed that defensive medicine is the most expensive 
aspect of the medical malpractice system (OTA, 2) . The Health Insurance Association of 
America reported in their 1975 study that defensive medicine creates between $3 billion and $6 
billion in health care expenses annually (Tancredi, 879). Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to 
measure the impact of defensive medicine on the cost of medical care in the U. S. today. Most 
often, surveys of physicians are used to estimate defensive medicine usage, but the surveys lack 
the ability to measure the unconscious acts of physicians. This become problematic as a 
physician may at first realize that ordering an extra test is to both help in diagnosis and limit their 
potential liability, but as this practice continues it will eventually become an ordinary part of 
their routine and therefore not reported as a defensive measure. Such studies generally consist of 
surveys sent to physicians asking what their actions would be in clinical scenarios and why they 
would choose these actions (liability risks being a possible explanation). These surveys are 
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generally considered less than reliable, having a nonresponse bias due to their response rate of 
less than fifty percent (OTA, 47). Physician surveys are conducted to show all defensive 
medicine. 
Today, defensive medicine is primarily divided into two categories: positive and 
negative; this is not to say that positive defensive medicine betters the healthcare industry and 
negative defensive medicine is the root of all problems. In fact, negative defensive medicine has 
only a minute effect on the overall cost of healthcare for patients (Tancredi, 879). Positive 
defensive medicine, characterized by an increase in diagnostic testing, referrals to other doctors, 
follow-up appointments, charting, or written informed consent, benefits the health of the patient 
overall (Summerton, 27). Positive defensive medicine is the most used type of defensive 
medicine, but it is also a major contributor to the rise in healthcare costs around the nation 
(Summerton, 28). Unfortunately, this cost is borne first by the health insurer and then eventually, 
through rise in premiums necessary to continue a profitable business, the insured (Quinn, 472). 
The aforementioned surveys have shown that less than eight percent of diagnostic tests are 
ordered with the reason being conscious concern ofliability (OTA, 1). Some believe a more 
realistic definition of positive defensive medicine is limited to "provision of services for which 
the added cost is less than the anticipated benefit" (Sloan and Chepke, 54). This is a critical 
definition because if the extra diagnostic tests ordered or the added physicians' time in charting 
and note-taking provide a benefit greater than the cost (such as an extra test finding cancerous 
cells in their early stages), then it is not technically defensive medicine. Another condition for 
defining an act as "defensive medicine" is that its primary reason is to avoid malpractice risk, but 
this may not be the only reason the physician chose to do it (OTA, 3). 
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Just as positive defensive medicine is generally considered positive for a patient ' s health, 
negative defensive medicine has an overall negative effect on the patient's health and well-being. 
Negative defensive medicine is commonly defined as avoiding risky treatments or refusing to see 
patients that are more likel y to result in a lawsuit (Tancredi, 879) (Summerton, 27) . It is often 
thought of as revenue-reducing defensive medicine because physicians will drop riskier portions 
of their practices (especially obstetrics and high-risk surgery), thus reducing their potential 
revenue (Quinn, 471 ). This can unfortunately lead to overutilization of simple procedures to 
boost revenue. Over thirty-four percent of physicians refuse to accept cases which they deem to 
involve "risky procedures" (Zuckerman, 131). High-risk patients incur greater healthcare costs as 
a result of such rejections, at the same time the physician's medical malpractice premiums 
decrease for dropping the risky procedures. This is a double-edged sword in the healthcare crisis 
and one for which lawmakers have not yet proposed a solution. Negative defensive medicine 
frequently hurts the patient because it makes the process of finding qualified and geographically 
close practitioners, especially for obstetricians and other high-risk specialties, extremely difficult 
and often stressful. Whether positive or negative for the patient, all defensive medicine benefits 
the physician-economically and psychologically (Hermer, 470). 
Each physician's acceptance, use, and definition of defensive medicine is unique and 
heavily influenced by their education and experience. In a 1995 study published in the British 
Medical Journal, Nicholas Summerton found a direct correlation between a physician's worry of 
being sued and their practice of defensive medicine (28). The more threatened a physician feels , 
the more likely-and willing-they are to go to defensive measures to protect their reputation. 
This explains why a 2005 study of Pennsylvania physicians, classified as working in high-risk 
specialties, found that ninety-three percent admitted to using defensive medicine on a daily basis 
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in their work (Hermer, 470). The problem is the line between customary practices, or the 
standard of care, and defensive medicine is not set in stone. (Tancredi, 881). The style in which 
residents practice medicine-their use of defensive medicine-is largely established by the 
specific doctor who trains them--their mentor (OT A, 36). Unfortunately, whether the physician 
sees the practice (that which causes more harm physically or economically than the benefit it 
provides) as defensive or standard care it still increases healthcare costs. Overall, most 
physicians admit to practicing defensive medicine in one form or another. Physicians practice 
various forms of defensive medicine to help lessen their risk of a malpractice lawsuit 
(Zuckerman, 131), (Reed, 207) : 
• 57% have improved their record keeping 
• 44% have referred more patients to a specialist 
• 40% have ordered more diagnostic tests 
• 35% have spent more time with patients 
• 27% have provided additional treatment measures 
• 74% have spent a greater amount of time writing clinical notes than if there was 
no fear of a lawsuit 
It is easily seen that defensive medicine is in fact a frequent and reoccurring practice in today's 
healthcare field. 
No physician wants to be sued. In fact they, just like most individuals, will go out of their 
way to please a patient and not have to deal with a lawsuit. Those who have been sued are more 
likely to practice defensive medicine to decrease the risk of another suit against them (Tancredi, 
880). A small increase in precaution, practicing defensive medicine, can result in a large 
decrease in expected liability (Kessler, 358). The most damaging part of a malpractice suit is the 
Gordon 
loss of reputation, not the time and money spent on defending their practice. This reputational 
loss is uninsurable, career damaging and enough of an incentive for most physicians to use 
defensive measures in their practice (Quinn, 471) . All other aspects of medical malpractice suits 
are insurable and of no cost to insured physicians beyond the premium (Sloan and Chepke 71) . 
Reputations are tarnished primarily by word of mouth with media often at the heart. One 
Washington, D.C. consumer group publishes lists of physicians deemed by the organization to be 
the defendants in an unreasonably high number of lawsuits . Depending on the number and 
severity of claims, many television stations and newspapers also do stories on suits filed against 
local physicians (Quinn, 469) . Although for the physician with only one or two small claims on 
his/her record the medical malpractice premium increases and media backlash may be minimal 
or nonexistence, many others are not so lucky. Eighty-six percent of physicians believe that just 
being named in a suit, no matter whether or not the suit actually makes it to court, has a lasting 
negative effect on their reputation and personal lives. Sixty-seven percent of the same group of 
physicians believe that lawsuits have a negative effect on patient-physician relationships (Reed, 
207) . This can be an unfortunate, yet continuous downward spiral; as relationships with patient 
begin to fade in importance to physicians, patients are more likely to bring suit against their 
physicians. 
A survey of women after giving birth showed that the women blamed their physician for 
forty-four percent of any adverse effects of the process, hospital staff for seven percent, 
themselves (patient) for ten percent, and left the other thirty nine percent of the blame to chance. 
Those with positive doctor-patient relationships throughout the entire experience reported less 
intention to file a claim against the physician and hospital (Moore, 248). Physicians must thus 
get to know each patient in order to avoid unnecessary lawsuits . Patients should know and 
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understand the purpose of each procedure performed. University of Michigan Health System ' s 
chief risk officer, Richard Boothman, believes that the cure to the current medical malpractice 
crisis is improving patient safety and communication (Science News, 2) . Local/small town 
physicians must work especially hard to please their patients as patients believe they are more 
likely to make a mistake than physicians in a more "prestigious" job (McQuade, 409) . Also, 
patients with increasing wealth and education are less satisfied with their medical care and more 
likely to file a malpractice claim (Moore). To overcome these obstacles physicians need to know 
each patient personally and understand exactly why they are in their care. 
Defensive medicine is seen as a positive practice primarily by those rare patients that 
benefit significantly from the extra tests and procedures. Cesarean deliveries and the 
management of head injuries in emergency rooms are highly influenced by defensive medicine 
(OTA,2) . A survey of physicians named a scenario ofa " 15 year-old boy with a minor head 
injury from a skateboard accident" with the greatest prevalence of conscious use of defensive 
medicine. Fifty percent of the physicians surveyed stated they would order a CT scan, and forty-
five percent of those stated defensive medicine as their primary reason for doing so (OTA, 5). 
Defensive medicine has also been cited as the primary reason for the recent increase in C-section 
births. Birth related lawsuits tend to be the most expensive malpractice suits because of their 
nature and life-long effects. Cesarean sections carry with them the same risks as any other 
surgery, often not completely considered (Tancredi, 881). In its 1994 study of defensive 
medicine and medical malpractice the congressional office of technology assessment found that 
nearly nine million dollars was spent each year on defensive Caesarian deliveries (OT A, 8). 
These instances of defensive medicine primarily benefit the physician. 
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Doctors believe the current medical malpractice liability system is at the heart of 
defensive medicine and many healthcare cost problems. The goal of the system is "providing 
redress to individuals who suffer negligent injuries creating incentives for doctors to provide 
appropriately careful treatment to their patients" (Kessler, 353). Basically the idea is that by 
taking negligent physicians to court other physicians will work to not make the same mistakes. 
Unfortunately, it is shown that the current system is not suited for preventing such injuries and 
compensating victims competently (Sloan and Chepke, 1). There is currently only a minor 
connection between the negligent acts of physicians that are detrimental to patients, and results 
that cause lawsuits (Hermer, 471). This means that many negligent physicians have no 
consequences and therefore continue practicing negligently. For those patients who believe they 
were victim to negligent care their claim mayor may not ever make it to trial, and those that do 
often take years to reach a verdict. Nearly twelve percent of claims take more than eight years to 
be resolved. This phenomenon makes setting medical malpractice premiums, which are meant to 
cover expenses for the given year, extremely difficult for the insurance carriers (Thorpe, W4-22). 
Overall, the severity of malpractice suits has been steadily rising since the early 1970's. This rise 
injury awards, along with many lawyers' contingency fee structure, has created an environment 
for frivolous lawsuits (Thorpe, W4-21) . Lawyers continue to take on cases and fight for the 
multi-million dollar jury award even though a menial number of medical malpractice lawsuits 
result in a verdict against the named physician. As litigation continues in this manner, it becomes 
less beneficial to the quality of medicine and the health of the healthcare industry as a whole 
(Charles, 437). The medical profession must be willing to discipline its members, or it too could 
end up similar to the financial industry and need the government to bail them out (McQuade, 
409). 
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Medical malpractice costs, especially the steeply rising premiums, are often cited as a 
critical reason physicians practice defensive medicine. The growing severity and frequency of 
lawsuits has forced medical malpractice insurance carriers to take a huge hit financially and, as a 
result, raise their premiums substantially . During the second such medical malpractice crisis, in 
1983, carriers reported $750 million in underwriting losses for just that year (Zuckerman, 128). 
Insurers reported an overall loss again in 2002. For each dollar they earned in medical 
malpractice premiums, insurers incurred one dollar and twenty-nine cents in expenses, a drop in 
after-tax income from twenty-three percent to negative eleven percent in just one year. These 
expenses included administrative, legal, settlements, and awards paid (Thorpe, W4-22). 
Although the lawsuits may not result in any out-of-pocket expenses sustained by physicians, for 
most the resultant premium rises cause an increase in overhead costs. Physicians and hospitals 
must pass these extra expenses on, just as insurance carriers must pass their losses on, usually to 
patients, taxpayers, and premium payers (hospitals or physician groups) (Tancredi, 879) (Sloan 
and Chepke 61). For many insurance companies, hospitals, and physicians the rising costs of 
malpractice liability has become too much. The St. Paul Company, which was previously the 
nation 's largest medical malpractice insurance carrier, left the market entirely after the 2002 
losses (Thorpe, W4-20). 
An often overlooked and overshadowed cause of medical malpractice premium increases 
is the decrease in interest rates (Thorpe, W4-21). Insurance companies invest physician's 
premiums until they are needed for claims payouts; this provides carriers with an additional 
source of income and ability to offer insurance at a reduced rate. As interest rates have decreased 
with the nation's impeding financial situation, this additional source of income has also 
dwindled . 
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Healthcare is currently a hot issue politically. Whether or not these premium increases are 
a basis of defensive medicine is debatable. Medical malpractice premium rates are often cited as 
a cause of the steep rise in healthcare prices. In actuality the malpractice liability systems, 
including insurance premiums, court costs, and payouts, account for only 1.5 percent of the 
nation's total healthcare costs (Hermer, 471) . If the price of medical malpractice premiums were 
to decrease by ten percent the cost of medical care would only fall by .132 percent (Thomas, 
1578). This may come as a surprise to much of the American population. A 2006 survey of 
small business owners found that nearly seventy-one percent believed rising malpractice 
premiums were at the root of growing healthcare costs (Morrisey, 2125).Unfortunately, 
malpractice litigation as a whole is not entirely innocent in the healthcare crisis. 
As doctors take their time and resources away from practicing medicine to deal with 
malpractice lawsuits they lose money primarily in lost income (Zuckerman, 128). In order to 
make up for these costs, they must raise prices. A 1983 survey done by the American Medical 
Association ' s Socioeconomic Monitoring System found that roughly thirty-one percent of 
physicians had increased fees due to malpractice costs . During the five year study from 1978-
1983 it was found that each claim filed against a physician caused them to be away from their 
practice for 2.7 days at a loss of$1 ,065 in possible income (Zuckerman, 131). A 1994 survey 
shows a claim to cost a physician anywhere from 2.5 to 5 days and between $2,400 and $5,600 
in missed income (OT A, 27-28) . In todays' economy that number would be much higher. Thus, 
as the number of claims filed increases the cost of healthcare consequently follows . Between 
]956 and 1990 the number of claims per 100 physicians rose from 1.5 to fifteen (Thorpe, W4-
24). So, although malpractice premium increases are not at the root of the healthcare crisis, they 
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do negatively affect physician's expenses. At the same time it is difficult to decide which is more 
damagjng in terms of costs to the patient- defensive medicine or malpractice lawsuits. 
Tort reforms, changes in the civil justice system, allow state governments to essentially 
lower malpractice insurance, with hope that the effect will trickle down to healthcare costs . 
Medical malpractice tort reforms first came into play during the malpractice crisis in the mid-
1970's. They gained popularity again during the next similar crisis in the mid-1980's (OTA, 11). 
Both of these times were deemed crises because of the sharp increases in premiums, similar to 
what was seen more recently in 2002 . By implementing tort reform laws states hope to do one 
(or all) of the following (OT A, 11) : 
• shorten statute of limitations 
• limit attorney fees for plaintiffs ' 
• implement pretrial claims screenings 
• caps on damages 
• changing the collateral source rule by allowing/requiring award to be reduced 
by amount paid through insurance 
• structured settlements instead of lump sum payments 
The most common types of tort reform are caps on damages and collateral-source-rule; both 
directly reduce jury awards (Kessler, 360) . The overall purpose of such tort reforms is to lower 
malpractice premiums in attempt to make the medical malpractice system less hostile towards 
physicians (Quinn, 18). For the most part states have had favorable results causing more states to 
begin implementing similar tort reforms. Loss ratios are 11.7 percent lower in states which cap 
rewards, 13.3 percent lower in states with collateral offsets, and for states with both, twenty-five 
percent lower. States are able to reduce both medical malpractice premiums and healthcare 
expenses simply by capping rewards. In 2003 premiums were 17.1 percent lower in states that 
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capped possible rewards (Thorpe, W4-20) In 2006 twenty-eight states had some type oflaw 
limiting malpractice case payouts, reducing their healthcare expenses by more than three percent 
(Hellinger, 6) . Although one can easily see that these reforms have effectively lowered 
malpractice premiums for physicians, it is important to ask, at what cost to the patient? As these 
reforms limit a physician's possible lawsuit expenses and consequently total liability, they could 
be negatively affecting the quality of medical care received (OTA, 75). Without punishment for 
negligent acts physicians may continue without realizing the harm they are doing. 
Essentially, tort reforms are implemented to decrease health care costs by reducing 
defensive medicine (Hellinger, 7). It seems simple that as possible rewards are lessened, amount 
of suits filed will decrease, and perceived threat of a suit filed will also decrease with the end 
result being physicians practice less defensive medicine. Unfortunately, there is little evidence 
that tort reforms in fact do make a difference in the amount of defensive medicine practiced by 
physicians (OTA, 11). Three common goals of tort laws are (Sumner, 1): 
1. Stop doctors from operating beyond expertise through use of medical malpractice suits 
2. Penalize those who practice low quality medicine 
3. Settlements/payouts for patients injured from low quality/negligent care 
In order for the tort system to be successful in deterring harmful care by physicians it must set 
guidelines of acceptable care and have the ability to improve the care currently being offered 
(OTA, 29). Therefore tort reforms must implement a standard of care and at the same time allow 
claims and resultant lawsuits to improve the quality of care Unfortunately, neither of these are 
the existing reality . 
Malpractice suits are widely known to increase physician ' s financial woes, but the impact 
on their emotional state is rarely analyzed. Defensive medicine is not purely practiced to save 
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physicians from excess financial worry, it is also important for their psyche. Sued physicians are · 
generally more likely to be depressed, have inner tension, anger, and frustration of the medical 
field compared to those which have never been sued (Charles, 438). Physicians who have only 
been sued once may not see a major change in their personal or professional lives (OT A, 10). A 
questionnaire study of physicians in 1985 showed that those whom had been sued were (Charles, 
440): 
• 48.9% more likely to discontinue seeing high-risk patients (negative defensive 
medicine) 
• 42.9 % considered retiring early 
• 32% discouraged their own children from choosing a career in medicine 
Family physician Dr. John Findley explained that the current complexity of modern medicine 
makes it impossible for individual physicians to deliver safe care; there are over 6,000 known 
diagnoses and 4,000 known drugs. Physicians must admit to not having all the answers and be 
willing to work with others (Kondro, E645). By admitting their weaknesses physicians can lower 
their liability and defensive medicine use. Their ultimate goal, driven by malpractice fear, is to 
practice at low levels of medical uncertainty; a level of medicine where the benefits are typically 
low and the dollar cost high (OT A, 1). As practicing medicine continues to become more 
complex the stresses involved cause many physicians to do whatever necessary to practice with 
the lowest possible risk-defensive medicine. 
As lobbyists and lawmakers alike already know, healthcare is an extremely difficult and 
complicated issue. Yes, defensive medicine is practiced by most, if not all, physicians in some 
fashion. Yes, it is known to generally increase the cost of a patients' healthcare more than the 
benefits a patient reaps. Yes, there are ways to combat its usage, but just how much of a 
difference is plausible? Who's decision is it that just because a diagnostic test for example only 
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discovers cancer, that has not already been detected, in lout of every 1,000 people it is not 
worth the cost. Defensive medicine is a difficult issue. Tort reforms are improving the situation, 
however, not as well or as fast as needed. Without a clear set of practicing guidelines and 
definition of defensive medicine it will be nearly impossible to reduce errors and healthcare 
costs. So although unnecessary defensive medicine practices and medical malpractice premiums 
may not be at the sole of the current healthcare crisis they are contributing factors and by 
reducing their financial impact a difference can be made. 
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